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Abstract—Consuming news from social media is becoming
increasingly popular. Social media appeals to users due to its
fast dissemination of information, low cost, and easy access.
However, social media also enables the widespread of fake
news. Because of the detrimental societal effects of fake news,
detecting fake news has attracted increasing attention. However,
the detection performance only using news contents is generally
not satisfactory as fake news is written to mimic true news. Thus,
there is a need for an in-depth understanding on the relationship
between user profiles on social media and fake news. In this
paper, we study the challenging problem of understanding and
exploiting user profiles on social media for fake news detection.
In an attempt to understand connections between user profiles
and fake news, first, we measure users’ sharing behaviors on
social media and group representative users who are more likely
to share fake and real news; then, we perform a comparative
analysis of explicit and implicit profile features between these
user groups, which reveals their potential to help differentiate
fake news from real news. To exploit user profile features, we
demonstrate the usefulness of these user profile features in a fake
news classification task. We further validate the effectiveness of
these features through feature importance analysis. The findings
of this work lay the foundation for deeper exploration of user
profile features of social media and enhance the capabilities for
fake news detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing amount of time spent on social
media, people increasingly tend to seek out and receive their
news through social media sites. In December 2016, the Pew
Research Center announced that approximately 62% of US
adults get news from social media in 2016, while in 2012, only
49% reported reading news on social media.1 This rapid rate
of increase in user engagements with online news can mainly
be attributed to the cheap, mobility, and fast dissemination of
social media platforms. However, despite these advantages, the
quality of news on social media is considered lower than that
of traditional news outlets. Every, large volumes of fake news,
i.e., news stories with intentionally false information [1], are
widely spread online. For example, a report estimated that
over 1 million tweets were related to the fake news story
“Pizzagate”2 by the end of 2016 presidential election.
Fake news has several significant negative societal effects.
First, people may accept deliberate lies as truths [2]. Second,
fake news may change the way people respond to legitimate
news. A study has shown that people’s trust in mass media
1http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-2016/
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pizzagate conspiracy theory
has dramatically degraded across different age groups and
political parties [3]. Finally, the prevalence of fake news has
the potential to break the trustworthiness of the entire news
ecosystem. Thus, it is critical to detect fake news on social
media to mitigate these negative effects, and benefit the general
public as well as the entire news ecosystem.
However, detecting fake news on social media presents
unique challenges. First, fake news is intentionally written to
mislead readers, which makes it nontrivial to detect simply
based on content; Second, social media data is large-scale,
multi-modal, mostly user-generated, sometimes anonymous
and noisy. Recent research advancements aggregate uses pro-
files and engagements on news pieces to help infer articles
that are incredible [4], leading to some promising early results.
However, no principled study is conducted on characterizing
the profiles of users who spread fake/real news on social
media. In addition, there has been no research that provides a
systematic understanding of (i) what are possible user profile
features; (ii) whether these features are useful for fake news
detection; and (iii) how discriminative these features are.
To give a comprehensive understanding, we investigate the
following three research questions:
• RQ1: Which users are more likely to share fake news or
real news?
• RQ2: What are the characteristics/features of users that
are more likely to share fake/real news, and do they have
clear differences?
• RQ3: Can we use user profile features to detect fake news
and how?
By investigating RQ1, we aim to identify users who are
more likely to share fake or real news, which can be treated
as representative user sets to characterize user profiles. By
answering RQ2, we can further provide guidance on assessing
whether the profiles of identified users are different or not,
and to what extent and in what aspects they are different.
In addition, by studying RQ3, we explore different ways to
model user profile features, analyze the importance of each
feature and show the feature robustness to various learning
algorithms. By answering these research questions, we made
the following contributions:
• We study a novel problem of understanding the relation-
ships between user profiles and fake news, which lays the
foundation of exploiting them for fake news detection;
• We propose a principled way to characterize and un-
derstand user profile features. We perform a statistical
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TABLE I: The statistics of FakeNewsNet dataset
Platform Politifact Gossipcop
# Users (without
filtering botss) 159,699 209,930
# Sharing 271,462 812,194
# True news 361 4,513
# Fake news 361 4,513
comparative analysis of these profile features, including
explicit and implicit features, between users who are more
likely to share fake news and real news, and show their
potentials to differentiate fake news; and
• We demonstrate the usefulness of the user profile fea-
tures to classify fake news on real-world datasets, whose
performance consistently outperforms existing state-of-
the-art features extracted from news content. We also
show that the extracted user profile features are robust
to different learning algorithms, with an average F1
above 0.90. We further validate the effectiveness of these
features through feature importance analysis, and found
that implicit features, e.g., political bias, perform better
than explicit features.
II. ASSESSING USERS’ SHARING BEHAVIORS
We investigate RQ1 by measuring the sharing behaviors
of users on social media on fake and real news. We aim
to identify users who are more likely to share fake or real
news, which can be further used to characterize discriminative
features for fake news detection.
A. Datasets
We utilize one fake news detection benchmark data reposi-
tory named FakeNewsNet [5]. The datasets are collected from
two fact-checking platforms: Politifact3 and Gossipcop4, both
containing news content with labels annotated by professional
fact-checkers, and social context information. News contents
include meta attributes (e.g., body text), and social context
includes the related user social engagements of news items
(e.g., user posting/sharing news) on Twitter. The detailed
statistics of the datasets are shown in Table I.
B. Filtering Bot Users
Social bots have been reported to play an important role to
spread fake news on social media [1], [6], [7]. The profiles
of bots are usually manipulated to hide their identities [7],
and may introduce noise on understanding the characteristics
of user profile features. To alleviate the effects of social
bots, we apply one of the state-of-the-art bot detection tool
Botometer5 [6] to filter out bot accounts. Botometer takes a
Twitter username as an input and utilizes various features
extracted from meta-data obtained from Twitter API and
3https://www.politifact.com/
4https://www.gossipcop.com/
5https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
outputs a probability in [0, 1], indicating how likely the user is
a social bot. Following the common setting, we filter out those
users who have a score greater than 0.5. We keep the remaining
users and treat them as authentic human users. Finally, we have
filtered out 14.2% (9, 231 out of 64, 901) and 13.7% (11, 257
out of 82, 163) users for fake and real news on Politifact, and
21% (26, 879 out of 127, 446) and 18.9% (11, 854 out of
62, 516) users for fake and real news on Gossipcop. We can
see that a bigger ratio of bot users exist among those who
spread fake news than those who spread real news.
C. Identifying User Groups
We identify different subsets of users based on their sharing
behaviors on fake and real news. By finding these groups, we
want to build representative user sets that are more likely to
share fake/real news from which we can further compare the
degree of the differences of their profiles to find useful profile
features. Towards answering RQ1, we propose two measures
to assess user-news sharing behavior as following:
1) Absolute Measure: To compare the sharing behavior of
user ui with other users, we compute the absolute number of
fake (real) news items that user ui has shared, denoted as n
(f)
i
(n(r)i ). Intuitively, if users share more fake news compared
with other users, they–as a population–tend to share fake news,
and vice versa. Thus, we select those users who share the most
absolute number of fake and real news, denoted as U (r)a ⊂ U
and U (f)a ⊂ U , where U is the set of all users. We compute
U (r)a = TopK(n(r)i ), indicating the top-K users that share the
most real news pieces; and U (f)a = TopK(n(f)i ), indicating
the top-K users that share the most fake news pieces.
2) Relative Measure: Even some users may not share many
fake news items relative to all users, they may still share more
fake news in history. Thus, we propose a metric named Fake
news Ratio (FR). FR(i) denotes the FR score of user ui as
FR(i) =
n
(f)
i
n
(r)
i +n
(f)
i
, which is equivalent to the total number of
fake news user ui has shared (i.e., n
(f)
i ), divided by the total
number of all news items he/she has shared (i.e., n(r)i +n
(f)
i ).
The larger the value, the higher the percentage of fake news
items that are being shared by ui.
3) User Groups: Based on the two measures, we introduce
a principled way to identify representative user groups U (f)
and U (r). First, we divide all users into three subsets: (1) “Only
Fake”: users who only spread fake news; (ii) “Only Real”:
users who only spread real news; and (iii) “Fake and Real”:
users who spread both fake and real news, as shown in Table II.
Second, we empirically select top 10,000 users from “Only
Fake” and “Only Real” ranked by the number of fake news
or real news they share; and then we further select users with
lower FR scores (FR ∈ [0, t]) and add to U (r) with a threshold
t; and select users with higher FR scores (FR ∈ [1 − t, 1])
and add them to U (f). By changing the threshold of t, we find
out we can obtain consistent results when t < 0.4, and when
t ≥ 0.4 more noisy tend to be included, and the comparison
analysis may not be accurate. Thus we set t = 0.2 to reduce the
TABLE II: Users are categorized into three groups: “Only
Fake”, “Only Real” and “Fake and Real”, according to whether
they share only fake news, only real news, or both fake and
real news.
PolitiFact GossipCop
# Only Fake 57,926 112,697
# Only Real 75,188 47,767
# Fake and Real 6,975 14,749
# Users 140,089 175,213
# Selected Users 10,684 11,785
noise for the feature analysis. The selected users are equally
sampled for both U (f) and U (r) (see Table II).
III. UNDERSTANDING USER PROFILES
Users in U (f) are more likely to share fake news, and those
in U (r) are more likely to share real news. However, it is
unknown to what extent and in what ways these users are
different . Therefore, we explore RQ2 to understand if there
are clear differences among users in U (f) and U (r). In order
to analyze the users from U (f) and U (r), we extract features
for each set and compare them.
We collect and analyze user profile features from different
aspects, i.e., implicit and explicit. Implicit features are not
directly available but are inferred from user meta information
or online behaviors, such as historical tweets. Explicit features
are obtained directly from meta-data returned by querying
social media site APIs. Our selected feature sets are by no
means the comprehensive list of all possible features. However,
we focus on those implicit features that are widely used in
the literature for better understanding user characteristics, and
explicit features that can be easily accessed and are available
for almost all public users. We assume that: if a feature f
reveals clear differences between U (r) and U (f), then f has
potential usefulness for detecting fake news; otherwise, f may
not be useful for fake news detection. We will further test and
verify this assumption in Section IV.
A. Implicit Profile Features
We explore several implicit profile features, which are
not directly provided through user meta-data from Twitter
API, but are widely used to describe and understand user
demographics [8]. Note that we adopt widely-used tools to
predict these implicit features in an unsupervised way. Our
goal is to perform a fair comparison analysis on the predicted
features, and the prediction accuracy of these features are not
guaranteed and not the focus of this paper.
Age: Studies have shown that age has impacts on people’s
psychology and cognition. For example, as age gradually
changes, people typically become less open to experiences,
but more agreeable and conscientious [9]. Using this feature,
we aim to answer whether users in different age groups have
different abilities to differentiate fake news.
(a) Age on PolitiFact (b) Age on GossipCop
Fig. 1: Age Comparison. We rank the ages from low to
high and plot the number for users. The x-axis represents the
predicted ages, and y-axis indicates the number of users.
We infer the age using an state-of-the-art approach [10],
which uses a linear regression model with the collected predic-
tive lexica (with words and weights). We use user recent tweets
as our corpus and extract relevant words in the lexica. The
results are shown in Figure 1. We also perform the statistical
t-test to verify whether predicted ages of users in U (f) and
U (r) are significantly different or not, and the p-value<0.05,
which indicates the results are statistically significant. From
Figure 1, we observe that there are larger number of users
who are predicted with older ages (e.g., after the peak point)
spreading real news than those spreading fake news; and there
are larger number of users who are predicted with younger
ages (e.g., before the peak point) spreading fake news than
those spreading real news, in both datasets.
Personality: Personality refers to the traits and characteris-
tics that makes an individual different from others. We draw
on the popular Five Factor Model (or “Big Five”), which
classifies personality traits into five dimensions: Extraversion
(e.g., outgoing, talkative, active), Agreeableness (e.g., trust-
ing, kind, generous), Conscientiousness (e.g., self-controlled,
responsible, thorough), Neuroticism (e.g., anxious, depressive,
touchy), and Openness (e.g., intellectual, artistic, insightful).
We try to answer the following question: do personality
differences clearly exist between U (f) and U (r)? To predict
personality, we apply an unsupervised personality prediction
tool named Pear [11], a state-of-the-art text-based personality
prediction model. Pear provides a pre-trained model using the
user historical tweets6. The results are shown in Figure 2,
6http://personality.altervista.org/pear.php
(a) Personality Distribution on
PolitiFact
(b) Personality Distribution on
GossipCop
Fig. 2: Personality Comparison. We measure personality with
Five Factor Model and demonstrate the average values of these
dimensions.
(a) Location on PolitiFact (b) Location on Gossipcop
Fig. 3: Location Comparison. Each point in the map denotes
the difference of number of tweets posted by users. Red
indicates more real news and blue shows more fake news.
where we can see that on both datasets: users in U (f) tend
to have relatively low Neuroticism, indicating less anxiety.
Interestingly, this observation contradicts with the findings
that emotion and anxiety makes people prone to fake news
and disinformation [12]. It is probably because that we use
tweets to characterize an individual’s “online personality”,
which could be biased by the tweets and show different results
with the his/her real personality.
Location: Research has shown an inseparable relationship
between user profiles and geo-locations. Even though users
are allowed to reveal their geo-location explicitly, the location
fields are very sparse, noisy, and unstructured [13]. Thus, we
exploit user-posted content to predict the user’s location [14],
[15], [16]. The idea is to identify “location indicative words”
(LIW), which can implicitly or explicitly encode an association
with a particular location. The implementation of a pre-trained
LIW model is integrated into an open source tool named
pigeo [16], which is utilized here to predict the geo-locations
of users in U (f) and U (r). The predicted results of pigeo are
at the city-level and also include (latitude, longitude) pairs,
from Figure 3 we observe that: (1) there are overall more
users located in the US than other places, which is because
most of the real/fake news items in our particular datasets are
published and related to US politics and entertainments; and
(2) the location distribution is different for fake and real news
on both datasets, and the red and blue dots demonstrate the
degree of differences. For example, there are general more real
news share in east region of US in our datasets.
Profile Image: Profile images are important visual compo-
nents of users on social media. Various studies have demon-
strated the correlation between the choice of profile images
with user personalities [17], behaviors, and activities [18]. We
aim to answer the following question: do users use different
types of profile images among those who are more likely to
share fake news versus real news? To test this hypothesis,
we classify the object types in profile images. With the
recent development of deep learning in the computer vision
domain, convolutional neural networks (CNN) have shown
good performance for detecting objects in images. We chose
the pre-trained VGG16 model [19] as it is the widely-used
CNN architecture. The resultant distribution of object types in
profile images are shown in Figure 4. We can see that: the
distributions of profile image classes are different for users in
U (f) and U (r) on both datasets. For example, there are specific
(a) Profile Image on PolitiFact (b) Profile Image on GossipCop
Fig. 4: Profile Image Comparison. The x-axis indicates
the 1000 image category labels from ImageNet. The y-axis
represents the difference of the user counts for fake news to
the user counts for real news.
(a) Political Bias on PolitiFact (b) Political Bias on GossipCop
Fig. 5: Political Bias Comparison. We plot the distribution of
number of users with “Left”, “Neutral”, and “Right” political
bias for both datasets.
image types7, such as “wig” and “mask” dominating the
image categories for users spreading fake news, and “website”
and “envelope” dominating the image categories for users
spreading real news, on both datasets consistently.
Political Bias: Political bias plays an important role in
shaping users’ profiles and affecting their news consumption
choices on social media. Sociological studies on journalism
demonstrate the correlation between partisan bias and news
content authenticity (i.e., fake or real news) [20]. Thus, we
aim to answer the following questions: (1) are users with
stronger political bias more likely to share fake news than real
news; and (2) are there clear differences in users’ political bias
distribution in fake and real news social engagements?
To answer these questions, we need to measure the political
bias scores of all users. Reports have shown people’s political
affiliation is correlated with their attributes and behaviors8.
Thus, we adopt method in [21] to measure user political bias
scores by exploiting users’ interests. The basic idea is that
users who are more left-leaning or right-leaning have similar
interests among each other. The resultant scores range from
[−1, 1], where -1 indicates the most right-leaning (republican-
leaning), 1 represents most left-leaning (democrat-leaning),
and 0 indicates the least-biased. We empirically set 0.5 as our
threshold such that scores that within [−1,−0.5], (−0.5, 0.5),
(0.5, 1] are treated as right-, neutral, and left-leaning. We
observe that: (1) users that are more likely to share fake news
(i.e., u ∈ U (f)) also have a high probability to be biased
on both datasets, and are more likely to be right-leaning; (2)
7http://image-net.org/explore
8https://2012election.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004818
users that are more likely to share real news (i.e., u ∈ U (r))
tend to be neutral-biased; and (3) overall, users in the two
datasets demonstrate different political bias score distributions,
indicating that the political bias of users could potentially help
differentiate fake/real news.
B. Explicit Profile Features
A list of representative profile attributes include:
• Basic user description fields (Profile-Related)
• Verified:whether this is a verified user;
• RegisterTime: the number of days since the accounted
was registered;
• Attributes of user activities (Content-Related)
• StatusCount: the number of posts;
• FavorCount: the number of favorites;
• Social networks attributes (Network-Related)
• FollowerCount: the number of followers;
• FollowingCount: the number of users being followed.
We compare these six fields and test whether the users in U (r)
and U (f) have clear differences. For categorical features such
as Verified, we demonstrate the ratio different categories; for
numerical features such as RegisterTime, we adopt the box-
and-whisker diagram to show the key quartiles of aggregated
statistics. Due to the space limitation and better organization,
we show the figures for RegisterTime. Other features are
analyzed similarly and omitted here, but are included here9.
Profile-related features are compared in Figure 6. We count
the number of verfied and unverified users on both datasets,
and observe that there are 938 and 188 more verified users
in U (r) than U (f) on PolitiFact and GossipCop, which shows
that verified users are more likely to share real news. We rank
RegisterTime values of all users in U (f) and U (r) and perform
a two-tail statistical t-test, and the p-value is less that 0.05.
In addition, the box-and-whisker diagram shows that the dis-
tribution of user RegisterTime exhibits a significant difference
between these user groups. The observations on both datasets
demonstrate that users who are more likely to share fake news
registered approximately 132 and 49 days earlier than those
users in U (r). This is consistent with previous work [4], which
is because new accounts are intentionally created to spread
fake news that are collected in recent years.
For content-related profile features, we rank the StatusCount
and FavorCount and perform a t-test, yielding the same obser-
vations on both datasets: (1) users in U (f) generally publish
fewer posts than users in U (r), which indicates those users
sharing more real news are likely to be more active; and (2)
users in U (f) tend to express more “favor” actions to tweets
posted by other users, indicating their willingness to reach out
to other users.
For network-related profile features, we rank the Follower-
Count and FollowingCount and perform a t-test, and observe
that user in U (f) have fewer followers and more following
counts from on both datasets significantly. For example, there
9The omitted figures are available at https://tinyurl.com/y5mmdj2u
(a) RegisterTime on PolitiFact (b) RegisterTime on GossipCop
Fig. 6: Profile Features Comparison. We show the Box-Plot
to demonstrate the distribution of RegisterTime for users.
are 46 and 579 fewer followers in U (f) for PolitiFact and
GossipCop, respectively.
In summary, we conclude that users in U (f) and U (r) reveal
different feature distributions in most explicit and implicit
feature fields, answering RQ2. These observations have great
potential to guide the fake news detection process, which will
be explored in detail in the next section.
IV. EXPLOITING USER PROFILES
In this section, we address RQ3. We explore whether the
user profile features can help improve fake news detection,
and how we can build effective models based on them, with
feature importance and model robustness analysis.
A. Experimental Settings
We first introduce how to extract user profile features f for
news a. Let U denote the set of users who share news a.
For each user ui ∈ U , we extract all types of aforementioned
profile features and concatenate them into one feature vector
ui. Note that for profile image features, since it has 1000
types, we use Principle Component Analysis [22] to reduce
the dimension to 10. Then we represent the user profile feature
of a news as the average feature scores of all the users that
share the news, i.e., f = 1|U|
∑
ui∈U ui. We also denote the
proposed User Profile Feature vector f as UPF.
To evaluate the performance of fake news detection al-
gorithms, we use the following commonly used metrics to
evaluate classifiers: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1. We
randomly choose 80% of news pieces for training and re-
maining 20% for testing, and the process is performed for
5 times and the average performance is reported. We compare
the proposed features UPF with several state-of-the-art feature
representations for fake news detection as below10:
• RST [23]: RST can capture the writing style of a docu-
ment by extracting the rhetorical relations systematically.
It learns a transformation from a bag-of-words surface
representation into a latent feature representation11.
10All data and code are available at https://tinyurl.com/y5mmdj2u
11The code is available at: https://github.com/jiyfeng/DPLP
TABLE III: Performance comparison for fake news detection with different feature representations.
Datasets Metric RST LIWC UPF RST UPF LIWC UPF
PolitiFact
Accuracy 0.782 0.830 0.909 0.918 0.921
Precision 0.777 0.809 0.948 0.949 0.942
Recall 0.786 0.861 0.864 0.883 0.897
F1 0.781 0.834 0.904 0.915 0.919
GossipCop
Accuracy 0.598 0.751 0.966 0.966 0.963
Precision 0.601 0.796 0.956 0.952 0.949
Recall 0.585 0.674 0.976 0.978 0.978
F1 0.593 0.730 0.966 0.967 0.963
• LIWC [24]: LIWC extracts lexicons that fall into differ-
ent psycholinguistic categories, and learn a feature vector
through multiple measures for each document12.
• RST UPF. RST UPF represents the concatenated fea-
tures of RST and UPF, which includes features extracted
from both news content and user profiles.
• LIWC UPF. LIWC UPF represents the concatenated
features of LIWC and UPF, which includes features
extracted from both news content and user profiles.
We compare UPF with state-of-the-art fake news detection
features that are extracted from news content, e.g., Rhetorical
Structure Theory (RST) discourse parsing [23] and Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) [24]. We also combine RST
and LIWC features with UPF to further explore if UPF have
complementary information.
B. Fake News Detection Performance Comparison
We test the baseline features on different learning algo-
rithms, and choose the one that achieves the best performance
(see Table III). The algorithms include Logistic Regression
(LogReg for short), Naı¨ve Bayes (NBayes), Decision Tree
(DTree), Random Forest (RForest), and AdaBoost. We used
the open-sourced scikit-learn13 machine learning framework
in Python to implement all these algorithms. To ensure a fair
comparison of features, we ran all the algorithms using default
parameter settings. We have the following observations:
• For news-content-based methods, we see that LIWC
performs better than RST. This indicates that the LIWC
vocabulary can better capture the deceptiveness in news
content, which reveals that fake news pieces are very
different from real news in terms of word choice from
psychometrics perspectives.
• Our proposed UPF can achieve good performance in
both datasets on all metrics. This shows that users that
share more fake news and real news have different
demographics and characteristics on social media, which
serve as good features for fake news detection.
• In addition, RST UPF performs better than either RST or
UPF, which reveals that they are extracted from orthog-
onal information spaces, i.e., RST features are extracted
from news content and UPF features from user profiles
on social media, and have complementary information to
help fake news detection.
12The software and description of measures are available at:
http://liwc.wpengine.com/
13https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
TABLE IV: Detection Performance for UPF with Different
Learning Algorithms
Dataset Model Acc Prec Recall F1
PolitiFact
RF 0.909 0.948 0.864 0.904
SVM 0.869 0.884 0.847 0.865
DT 0.848 0.849 0.844 0.847
LR 0.848 0.867 0.819 0.842
GossipCop
RF 0.966 0.956 0.976 0.966
SVM 0.918 0.920 0.916 0.918
DT 0.931 0.931 0.930 0.931
LR 0.914 0.918 0.909 0.914
C. Choice of Learning Algorithms
To evaluate the robustness of the extracted features UPF,
we compare the fake/real news classification performances
using different common classifiers, i.e., Random Forest (RF),
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Trees (DT), and
Logistic Regression (LR). The results are shown in Table IV.
These algorithms have different learning biases, and thus their
performance is often different for the same task. While we
observe that: (1) RF achieves the best overall performance
on both datasets; and (2) while the performance of RF is
slightly better than other learning algorithms, the results are
not significantly different across algorithms. This demonstrates
that when sufficient information is available in the user profile
features, the performance is not very sensitive to the choice
of learning algorithms.
D. Feature Importance Analysis
Now we analyze the relative importance of these features
for predicting fake news. We analyze feature importance in
the Random Forest (RF) by computing a feature importance
score based on the Gini impurity [25]14. The top 5 common
important features (with Gini impurity scores) are:
1) RegisterTime (0.937): the feature vector indicating the
average distribution of verified and unverified users;
2) Verified (0.099): the feature vector indicating the average
distribution of verified and unverified users;
3) Political Bias (0.063): the average bias score;
4) Personality (0.036): the average distribution of users’
personality scores characterized by five factors distribu-
tion;
5) StatusCount (0.035): the average count of user posts.
14http://scikit-learn.org/stable/auto examples/ensemble/plot forest
importances.html. A higher Gini impurity score indicates a higher importance
TABLE V: Detection Performance with Different Group of
Features from UPF
Dataset Feature Group Acc Prec Recall F1
PolitiFact
All 0.909 0.948 0.864 0.904
Explicit 0.870 0.891 0.841 0.865
Implicit 0.837 0.892 0.763 0.823
GossipCop
All 0.966 0.956 0.976 0.966
Explicit 0.894 0.884 0.906 0.895
Implicit 0.961 0.956 0.967 0.962
We observe that (1) RegisterTime is the most important
feature because newly created account may be more likely
for fake news propagation purpose; (2) the distribution of
verified/unverified user counts is important as verified users
are less likely to spread fake news (3) the average political bias
score is important because those users who share fake news
are more likely to be biased to a specific ideology, while users
that share real news tend to be least biased; (4) personality
features are discriminative for detecting fake news because
users’ personalities affect their cognition and the way they
respond to the real world [26]; and (5) the high importance
score of StatusCount shows that the degrees of user activeness
are quite different among users spreading fake and real news.
We further categorize the user profile features into three
groups: Explicit, Implicit and All (i.e., both explicit and
implicit features) and compare their contributions to the fake
news detection task. The results are shown as in Table V.
We observe that; (1) when all profile features are considered,
the performance is higher than when only explicit or implicit
features are considered. For example, the F1 scores on All fea-
tures show a 4.51% and 9.84% increase compared with explicit
and implicit feature groups on PolitiFact. This demonstrates
that explicit and implicit features contain complementary
information that can improve detection performance. (2) The
implicit feature group is much more effective than the explicit
feature group on Gossipcop for Accuracy and F1 scores. Note
that implicit features require user-generated content to infer
their values, which requires more effort to construct, while
explicit features are often directly available in users’ raw data.
These observations allow us to better balance the trade-off with
limited time and resources to make more informed decisions
when building these feature groups.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the related work from two
aspects: (1) fake news detection on social media; and (2)
measuring user profiles on social media.
A. Fake News Detection on Social Media
Fake news detection approaches generally fall into two
categories depending on whether they use (1) news con-
tent; and (2) social contexts [1]. For news content based
approaches, features are extracted as linguistic-based such
as writing styles [27], and visual-based such as fake im-
ages [28]. Linguistic-based features capture specific writing
styles and sensational headlines that commonly occur in fake
news content [27], such as lexical and syntactic features.
Visual-based features try to identify fake images [28] that
are intentionally created or capturing specific characteristics
for images in fake news. News content based models include
i) knowledge-based: using external sources to fact-checking
claims in news content [29], [15], and 2) style-based: capturing
the manipulators in writing style, such as deception [30]
and non-objectivity [27]. Social context based approaches
incorporate features from social media user profiles, post
contents, and social networks. User features measure users’
characteristics and credibility [4]. Post features represent
users’ social responses, such as stances [31]. Network features
are extracted by constructing specific social networks, such as
diffusion networks [32] or co-occurrence networks [33]. All
of these social context models can basically be grouped as
either stance-based or propagation-based. Stance-based models
utilize users’ opinions towards the news to infer news verac-
ity [31]. Propagation-based models apply propagation methods
to model unique patterns of information spread [31].
Existing approaches that exploit user profiles simply extract
features to train classifiers without a systematic understanding,
which makes it a black-box that is difficult to interpret. Thus,
to improve the explanatory power of fake new detection and to
understand how to exploit user profiles to detect fake news, we
perform, to our best knowledge, the first in-depth investigation
of user profiles for their usefulness for fake news detection.
B. Measuring User Profiles on Social Media
User profiles on social media generally contain both ex-
plicit and implicit features. Explicit profile features (e.g., post
count), which are already provided in raw user meta data,
are widely exploited in different tasks on social media, such
as information credibility classification [4] and user identity
linkage [34]. While implicit profile features (e.g., personality),
which are not directly provided, have proven very useful to
apply to several specific analysis tasks. For age prediction,
previous studies extract features from text posted by users [35].
Schwartz et al. predicts gender, personality, and/or age simul-
taneously with open-vocabulary approaches [8]. For political
bias prediction, existing works rely on tweets and hashtags,
network structure [36], and language usage styles [37]. Loca-
tion prediction can be performed using “Location Indicative
Words” (LIW) [16]. Profile images can be predicted using a
pre-trained model [38] in an unsupervised manner.
We consider and extract both provided explicit and inferred
implicit user profile features to better capture the different
demographics of users for fake news detection.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we aim to answer questions regarding nature
and extent of the correlation between user profiles on social
media and fake news and provide a solution to utilize user
profiles to detect fake news. Now, we summarize our findings
of each research question and discuss future work.
RQ1 Which users are more likely to share fake news or
real news? To perform this study, we construct two real-world
datasets, both including news content and social context, with
reliable ground truth. We used both the absolute measure and
relative measure to assess users’ sharing behaviors in news,
and identified two sets of users representing those who are
more likely to share fake/real news.
RQ2 What are the characteristics of users that are more
likely to share fake/real news, and do they have clear dif-
ferences? With the two selected sets of users, we explore
their profiles from both explicit and implicit perspectives.
We perform detailed statistical comparisons of these fea-
tures and found that most of the features have distinct val-
ues/distributions. These findings pave the way to build related
features to detect fake news.
RQ3 Can we use user profile features to detect fake news
and how? We endeavor to build learning algorithms to utilize
them to detect fake news. We evaluate the effectiveness of the
extracted user profile features by comparing them with several
state-of-the-art baselines. We show that: (1) these features can
make significant contributions to help detect fake news; (2)
these features are overall robust to different learning algo-
rithms and can consistently achieve good results; and (3) in
case of limited time or resources, one can implement a limited
set of features and obtain reasonable good performance.
This work opens up the doors for many areas of research.
First, we will investigate the potential and foundation of other
types of user feature in a similar way, such as content features
and social network features, for fake news detection. Second,
we will further investigate the correlations between malicious
accounts and fake news to perform jointly detecting malicious
accounts and fake news pieces. Third, we will explore various
user engagement behaviors such as reposts, likes, comments,
to further understand their utilities for fake news detection.
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